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Abstract— Privacy has become a major issue for policy 
makers. This has been impelled by the rapid development of 
technologies that facilitate collection, distribution, storage, and 
manipulation of personal information. Business organizations 
are finding new ways of leveraging the value derived from con-
sumer information. On the other hand, consumers have ex-
pressed concerns that their rights and ability to control their 
personal information are violated. Paradoxically, it appears 
that users provide personal data freely and willingly, as it has 
been observed on Facebook and other social networks. This 
study is an attempt to understand the relationship between 
individuals’ intentions to disclose personal information, their 
actual personal information disclosure behaviours, and how 
these can be leveraged to develop privacy-enhancing identity 
management systems (IDMS) that users can trust. Legal, regu-
latory and technological aspects of privacy and technology 
adoption are also discussed. 
 
Keywords—Privacy, Trust, Identity, Identity Management   
I. INTRODUCTION 
Incidences of cyber fraud and abuse of privacy on the Inter-
net can have serious consequences for electronic business 
and the users‘ trust in performing online transactions. When 
security is breached, it also endangers user privacy and trust 
in institutions.  Such security breaches have contributed to a 
growing desire for efficient and cost-effective measures in 
the design and administration of IDentity Management Sys-
tems (IDMS).  
Several governmental and business initiatives seek to 
place the administration and control of identity information 
directly in the hands of individuals. These initiatives are 
aimed at curtailing security breaches and abuses of privacy 
in order to boost user confidence in online transactions and 
interactions. They require that individuals be given the right 
to exercise control over the collection, use, and disclosure of 
their personal information – their digital personae. Previous 
researches have proposed Fair Information Practice (FIP) 
principles, Privacy by Design (PbD) and The Seven Laws of 
Identity [1], [2], and [3]. These proposed frameworks and 
best practices seek to balance an individual's right to privacy 
with the organization's legitimate need to collect, use, and 
disclose personal information. Such attempts to give users 
the latitude to their digital identities are generally referred to 
as user-centric. 
Unfortunately, researchers and developers of user-centric 
IDMS have mainly focused on making existing IDMS archi-
tectures interoperable, while privacy should actually be at 
the core of the IDMS design. Again, there is the perception 
that even though individuals advocate for their privacy, they 
have little or no reservations in releasing their personal in-
formation in social networks (e.g. Facebook).  
This so-called ―privacy paradox‖ is what motivates our 
study. Furthermore, many of the current initiatives are fo-
cused on online solutions and services in the digital world, 
but identity management also needs to take into account 
differences between users‘ behaviour in the physical and the 
digital world. The objective of this work is therefore to un-
derstand the major issues involved in the design of privacy-
enhancing IDMS and contribute to improved framework and 
design principles for these. 
The paper analyses existing international privacy regula-
tions and the proposed standards and best practices in view 
of Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) [4]. The remain-
ing part is divided into five sections. Section II contains def-
initions and concepts and gives a review of research on 
identity management, privacy and trust. In Section III, some 
of the major frameworks, initiatives and best practices are 
presented and compared. Section IV deals with privacy en-
hancing technologies for authentication and authorization, in 
particular U-Prove and OAuth. In Section V we present an 
updated framework and discuss the requirements and guide-
lines for realizing privacy-enhancing identity management, 
and finally, Section VI summarizes our finding and conclu-
sions and give some recommendations for future studies. 
II. IDENTITY MANAGEMENT, PRIVACY AND TRUST 
The objective of this work is to understand the major issues 
involved in the design of privacy-enhancing IDMS. This is 
based on the premise that designing privacy enhancing tech-
nology is not just a technological problem but theoretical, 
social and regulatory dimension must also be addressed. The 
research problem then is ―What factors must be considered 
in designing privacy-enhancing IDMS that address both 
online and offline identity management issues?‖. To address 
the research question we analysed the major privacy and 
data protection regulations, research initiatives, privacy-
enhancing technologies in the light of technology ac-
ceptance model. 
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A. Identity and Identity Management 
Identity in information systems consists of traits, attributes, 
and preferences, based on which an individual may receive 
personalized services. These services could be online, on 
mobile devices, or face-to-face (Liberty, 2004). In essence, 
identity has both physical and digital dimensions. Digital (or 
electronic) identity is therefore an electronic representation 
of a real-world entity or an online equivalent of an individu-
al (Roussos, Peterson, & Patel, 2003). Traditionally, IDMS 
are run by organizations that control all mechanisms for 
authentication (establishing confidence in an identity 
claim‘s truth) and authorization (deciding what an individual 
should be allowed to do), as well as any behind-the-scenes 
profiling or scoring of individuals [5].  
 In this study, we adopt the Van Thuan (2007) definition 
of IDMS as “consisting of processes, policies and technolo-
gies used to manage the complete lifecycle of user identities 
across a system and to control the user access to the system 
resources by associating their rights and restrictions”. 
To ensure protection of privacy, security and provision of 
trusted services, different variations of IDMS were used 
throughout history to establish the basis for trade and gov-
ernance by means of tokens and technologies, seals, coded 
messages, signatures, jewellery, etc. (3G_Americas, 2009). 
There has been a tremendous growth in in online govern-
ment services, business transactions and social interactions 
via single sign-on (SSO) (Aichholzer & Strauß, 2009). Such 
activities require efficient and effective user identification 
and authentication, making IDMS very challenging. Clarke 
(1994) posits that identification is “the association of data 
with a particular human being”. Authentication is a process 
that results in a person being accepted as authorized to en-
gage in or perform some activity (Whitley, 2009). Lips 
(2008) suggested a shift in focus towards analyses of the 
wider societal implications of IDMS implementation and 
related social design issues.  
B. Concepts of Privacy 
Privacy refers to the claim or right of individuals to exercise 
a measure of control over the collection, use and disclosure 
of their personal information. Westin (2003) described pri-
vacy concern as customers‘ apprehension over the acquisi-
tion and use of their personal data.  
Until recently, personal identity and privacy were some-
thing of which each human being could exercise a reasona-
ble degree of control [6]. With the advent of the Internet and 
high-speed communication technologies, it has become an 
illusion for users to assume physical control over the collec-
tion and use of their personal information since data can be 
mishandled. For example in many instances, users have little 
or no involvement the dissemination of their personal in-
formation. In essence, mishandled personal information puts 
individual‘s privacy interests at risk.  
It is for this reason that governments must protect their 
citizens. Interestingly, many of the present privacy legisla-
tions in Europe were drafted on the basis of the Strasburg 
Convention of 1981 [6]. Therefore, legislation does not ade-
quately assist in resolving contemporary privacy intrusion 
cases. 
Furthermore, what constitutes personal information has 
comparatively widened due to increased usage of digital 
media for business and social interactions, e.g. user names, 
passwords, etc. Moreover, the concept of privacy has both 
collective and individual dimensions [7]. Hence, privacy 
cannot be conceptualised as autonomy from collective 
norms. This is what informs the debate on whether privacy 
protection is best approached on the basis that it is a private 
good or a common good [8]. The rights and obligations of 
individuals in many countries have therefore been weighed 
against the collective security and public safety goals – par-
ticularly in the USA and UK [8].  
C. Concepts of Trust 
Privacy concern has far-reaching effects on individuals‘ 
attitudes towards IDMS. Where there is the concern of vul-
nerability, people become apprehensive towards the sys-
tems. According to the Oxford Dictionary, trust is the belief 
that somebody or something is good, sincere, honest, etc., 
with no intention to harm or trick. There are different re-
search positions on what constitutes trust and on the out-
comes of trust [9]. In the literature, trust has been defined as 
the confidence in an exchange partner‘s reliability and integ-
rity [10]. This confidence provides the basis for customers 
to believe in the reliability and integrity of organizations. It 
is one of the building blocks for information is sharing. 
Milne & Boza (1999) and Norberg et al. (2007) examined 
how privacy concerns are related to trust. They have sug-
gested that increasing trust can mitigate privacy concern.  
In Mayer et al. (1995) trust is conceptually distinct from 
the behaviours that may or may not reflect it. Without a 
clear distinction between the behaviours the difference be-
tween trust and similar constructs is blurred. For instance, 
Mayer et al. conceptualized trust as the willingness of a par-
ty to be vulnerable to the actions of another party based on 
the expectation that the other party will perform a particular 
action important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to 
monitor or control that other party.  
Effectively, in a trustworthy relationship, individuals are 
motivated to share personal information freely with no fear 
of exploitation. Hence, trust can influence both positive and 
negative behaviour of people. This claim is shared by [11]. 
They observed that the basic ingredients of trust are: 1) de-
pendence on the trusted party, 2) reliability of the trusted 
party, and 3) risk in case the trusted party does not perform 
as expected. This implies that trust requirements have direct 
correlation with risk exposure.  
In the study conducted by Mayer et al., three important 
characteristics of trust were revealed: Ability, benevolence 
and integrity. Ability also implies competence or perceived 
expertise. Consistency, fairness and reliability were also 
used to have also used to describe integrity whereas loyalty 
openness and availability were used to describe benevo-
lence. These trust characteristics are adopted in this study as 
the constructs of trust. 
D. The Privacy Paradox 
In many privacy scenarios, commercial interests seek to 
maximize the value of consumer information. For instance, 
many websites that provide useful information also require 
users to register in order to access the information. Even 
though individuals may be willing to part with personal in-
formation in order to realize the perceived benefits, many 
express concern about the violation of their rights and ability 
to control their personal information.  
If we had perfect identity, security would not be an issue, 
just as systems with perfect anonymity will not present any 
privacy problem. In spite of the complaints, common use of 
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Facebook, Twitter, etc., indicates that consumers quite often 
freely release personal data in their interactions and business 
transactions [12]. This is referred to as ―The Privacy Para-
dox‖ [12], [6]. Privacy paradox is the relationship between 
individuals‘ intentions to disclose personal information and 
their actual personal information disclosure behaviours. 
An IBM 2008 survey suggests that individuals see a 
trade-off between the increased value of services and the 
consequent erosion in their privacy [13]. Consumers are on 
the one hand seeking for online experience devoid of fraud, 
cheaper and more conveniently delivered. Yet, there are 
fears that this could lead to an erosion of users‘ privacy. In 
essence, technology has a dual nature: User empowerment 
and raising security and privacy concerns. 
E. Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) 
Factors affecting technology adoption have been extensively 
studied in the Information Systems literature. Morris & Dil-
lon (1997) posit that user acceptance is ―the demonstrable 
willingness within a user group to employ information tech-
nology for the tasks it is designed to support‖. Notable re-
search on adoption and diffusion of technology includes 
Innovation Diffusion Theory (Rogers, 1983), TAM (Davis, 
1989) and the unified theory of acceptance and use of tech-
nology (UTAUT) (Venkatesh & Davis, 2000).  
 
 
In Davis (1989) perceived usefulness (PU) and perceived 
ease of use (PEOU) were theorized to be fundamental de-
terminants of behavioural intentions to accept or reject in-
formation technology, cf. Fig. 1. Perceived usefulness essen-
tially describes the degree to which a person believes that an 
innovation will boost their performance (Davis, 1989). Per-
ceived ease of use on the other hand describes the degree to 
which a person believes that adopting an innovation will be 
free of effort. In effect, users are more likely to adopt sys-
tems, which are easier to use and offer some benefits, since 
these two factors can affect the behavioural intention to con-
sider using it and actually using the innovation. Behavioural 
intentions are formed on the basis of an individual‘s attitude, 
subjective norms, and perceived control of an outcome [14].  
Perceived usefulness, perceived ease of use and behav-
ioural intentions will have already been proven to be a relia-
ble means for determining adoption of technology [4], [15]. 
This study introduces aspects of trust and privacy in the de-
sign of privacy-enhancing IDMS.  This is based on the 
premise that users will feel comfortable with systems that 
protect their privacy and are more likely to release personal 
information to only trusted third parties – the essence of user 
centricity [16]. 
III. FRAMEWORKS AND INITIATIVES 
A. Regulatory Framework on Privacy 
Motivations for good behaviour can generally be analysed 
based on the risk of data disclosure and regulatory exposure. 
Regulation in this regard can be categorized into national 
and international. The Fair Information Practice principles 
(FIP) are a set of such principles developed in the 1970s, 
which has been adopted by many government agencies, pub-
lic interest groups, and private companies around the world 
[5]. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and De-
velopment (OECD) issued a set of data protection guide-
lines, which are an adaptation of FIPs. These guidelines fo-
cus on privacy as personal data flows between member 
countries. It addresses the collection and use of personal 
data, such as names, addresses, government-issued identifi-
ers, etc.  
The OECD guidelines are very instructive for design of 
privacy-enhancing IDMS. The key sections are as follows 
[17]: 
 Collection limitation. Limits to the collection of person-
al data should exist. Personal data should be collected 
by lawful and fair means and, where appropriate, with 
the knowledge or consent of the data subject (the indi-
vidual). 
 Data quality. Personal data should be relevant to the 
purposes for which it is collected and used. It should be 
accurate, complete, and timely.  
 Purpose Specification Principle. The purpose for which 
personal data are collected must be specified no later 
than at the time of date collection and subsequent use 
must be limited to the fulfilment of those purposes or 
such others as are not incompatible with the original 
purpose and as are specified on each occasion of change 
of purpose. 
 Use limitation. Personal information should not be dis-
closed or otherwise used for other than a specified pur-
pose without consent of the individual or legal authori-
ty. 
 Security. Reasonable security safeguards against such 
risks as loss, unauthorized access, destruction, use, 
modification and disclosure should protect personal da-
ta.  
 Openness. The existence of systems containing personal 
data should be publicly known, along with a description 
of the system‘s main purposes and uses of the personal 
data in the system.  
 Individual Participation. An individual should have the 
right: a) to obtain confirmation from a data controller, 
or otherwise, any information relating to them within a 
reasonable time. The cost of obtaining such information 
must be reasonable and in a form that is readily intelli-
gible to him.  
 Accountability. The keepers of personal data should be 
accountable for complying with fair information prac-
tices. These principles are the logical starting point for 
anyone designing an identity management system. 
There are also various country- (or region-) specific laws 
on privacy that seek to protect privacy. In Europe for in-
stance, many of the privacy and data protection laws have 
been brought together as a harmonized European Union 
(EU) data protection directive. All EU member states are 
required to comply. The Directive provides mechanisms to 
track misuse of personal data and protection against the mis-
 
Fig. 1. Main elements of the Technology Acceptance Model (Adapted from 
[4]). 
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application of personal data [18]. Unlike the FIPs, bleaching 
legislations and directives can result in prosecution in 
courts. 
 The major defects of the regulatory framework are two-
fold. In the first place, FIPs originate long before the World 
Wide Web and the digital age [5]. Hence, they are inade-
quate in dealing with modern privacy since acquisition and 
use of personal information occurs in microseconds and 
usually with no direct involvement of parties. Secondly, on 
the Internet, there are no specific border demarcations, mak-
ing it difficult to enforce country- or region-specific laws on 
privacy and data protection. This is because culprits might 
not be nationals of the countries, where the incidence oc-
curred (e.g. the WikiLeaks cases).  
B. User-Centric Identity Management Systems 
The focus on users‘ quest for power to exercise information-
al self-determination has resulted in several user-centric and 
claims-based IDMS initiatives (PrimeLife, 2009), (FIDIS, 
2007), (Cameron, 2005). User-centric IDMS is an approach 
to give users greater control over their personal information. 
However, the notion of user centricity does not imply a 
trade-off between security and usability, but rather a focus 
on user‘s privacy and trust. For instance, in their Austrian 
IDMS study, Aichholzer & Strauß (2009) identified equality 
of access, privacy protection and user convenience as major 
factors determining users‘ acceptance of IDMS. Cameron‘s 
Seven Laws of Identity have therefore been widely regarded 
as a guide for providing user-centric IDMS solutions. Gen-
erally, the laws of identity prescribe the need for consistent 
user experiences in online transactions, user understanding, 
user choices and control, and minimum disclosure of user 
information to only the intended parties.  
Identity providers therefore act as trusted third parties to 
store user accounts and profile information and authenticate 
users [19]. Service providers on the other hand accept asser-
tions or claims about users from the identity providers. 
Since identity providers do not form a federation in a user-
centric IDMS model they are seen as operating in the inter-
est of users instead of the service providers (also called ―re-
lying parties‖).  
A feature in user-centric IDMS, which makes them more 
privacy enhancing, is the fact that users have the privilege of 
choosing what information to disclose when dealing with 
service providers in particular transactions and still satisfy 
the need to provide certain information for the transaction 
require [19], [20]. 
C. Privacy Research Initiatives 
To address the inefficiencies of regulations discussed above, 
a wide range of industry, academic, and governmental or-
ganizations in Europe joined forces in a number of research 
projects, among these ―Privacy and Identity Management 
for Europe (Prime)”, and “Privacy and Identity Manage-
ment in Europe Throughout Life (PrimeLife)” [21]. These 
projects have developed working prototypes of privacy-
enhancing IDMS, These EU initiatives provide very good 
frameworks for building privacy-protecting IDMS, although 
they do not cover US specific regulations.  
Kim Cameron, Microsoft Identity Architect, and Ann Ca-
voukian, Ontario‘s Information Privacy Commissioner, have 
done a lot of research on privacy, which is becoming indus-
try standard. In her paper, ―7 Laws of Identity: The Case for 
Privacy-Embedded Laws in the Digital Age,‖ Cavoukian 
(2008) offered a unique interpretation of Cameron‘s Laws of 
Identity. Cavoukian further proposed seven foundational 
privacy principles, referred to as Privacy by Design (PbD) 
principles. Her proposal was based on the notion that inno-
vation, creativity and competitiveness must be approached 
from a design thinking perspective [22]. In a separate study, 
Peter Schaar posits that ―PbD is adjuvant for all kinds of IT 
systems designated or used for the processing of personal 
data. It should be a crucial requirement for products and 
services provided to third parties and individual customers.‖ 
[3]. Table I provides a summary of the seven laws of identi-
ty, the FIPs and Cavaokian‘s PbD. 
 
 
TABLE I 
MAPPING OF THE LAWS OF IDENTITY, PRIVACY BY DESIGN AND THE FAIR 
INFORMATION PRACTICES 
Seven Laws of Identity 
FAIR 
INFORMATION 
PRACTICES 
(FIP) 
Privacy by 
Design 
1 – User Control and Consent: 
Technical identity systems must 
only reveal information identify-
ing a user with the user‘s consent 
 
Collection limi-
tation 
 
Privacy as 
the default 
setting 
 
2 – Minimal Disclosure for a 
Constrained Use: The identity 
metasystem must disclose the 
least identifying information 
possible, as this is the most sta-
ble, long-term solution. 
Data quality 
Privacy as 
the Default 
Setting 
 
3 – Justifiable Parties: IDMSs 
must be designed so the disclo-
sure of identifying information is 
limited to parties having a neces-
sary and justifiable place in a 
given identity relationship. 
Purpose Specifi-
cation 
 
 
Use limitation.  
Privacy as 
the default 
setting 
 
4 – Directed Identity: 
A universal identity meta system 
must support both ―omnidirec-
tional‖ identifiers for use by 
public entities and ―unidirection-
al‖ identifiers for use by private 
entities, thus facilitating discov-
ery and prevent unnecessary 
release of correlation handles 
Security  
End-to-End 
Security 
Full lifecycle 
protection 
Proactive and 
Preventive 
 
5 – Pluralism of Operators and 
Technologies: 
A universal identity solution 
must utilize and enable the in-
teroperation of multiple identity 
technologies run by multiple 
identity providers. 
 
Openness 
Visibility and 
Transparency 
–keep it open 
 
6 - Human Integration: 
The identity metasystem must 
define the human user to be a 
component of the distributed 
system, integrated through unam-
biguous human-machine commu-
nication mechanisms offering 
protection against identity attacks 
Individual Par-
ticipation  
Privacy 
Enhancing 
Design 
Full Func-
tionality 
 
7 – Consistent Experience across 
Contexts: The unifying identity 
metasystem must guarantee its 
users a simple, consistent experi-
ence while enabling separation of 
contexts through multiple opera-
tors and technologies 
Accountability  
and Audit 
Visibility and 
Transparency 
– Keep it 
open. 
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The seven laws of identity also describe the basis for a 
―unifying identity metasystem‖ that can be applied to identi-
ty on the Internet. The Identity Metasystem is an interopera-
ble architecture for digital identity, which assumes that users 
will have several digital identities based on multiple under-
lying technologies, implementations, and providers [1]. It 
ensures that not only are individuals in control of their iden-
tity, but also organizations will be able to continue to use 
their existing identity infrastructure investments, choose the 
identity technology that works best for them, and more easi-
ly migrate from old technologies to new technologies with-
out sacrificing interoperability with others [1].  
The major informational privacy [23] emanating from 
digital identities in the identity metasystem are observability 
and linkability. Observability is the possibility that others, 
including communicating parties, service providers, eaves-
droppers and third parties will gain information. Linkability 
on the other hand describes the possibility of linking differ-
ent data or data sets to an individual for further analysis. 
IV. PRIVACY-ENHANCING TECHNOLOGIES 
The move to online services offers great promise in terms of 
both cost reduction and improved user experience. However, 
the realization of this promise has been severely hampered 
by the lack of trust on the Internet – specifically, the absence 
of a practical mechanism for users to obtain and present 
strong, verified digital identity information online. In some 
cases, the information simply is not available in a digital 
form; however, even when it is available, the current set of 
identity technologies force a trade-off between the level of 
identity information assurance that can be achieved and the 
level of privacy given to users. Further, the user‗s experi-
ence for providing this information is often inconsistent and 
difficult, and sometimes redundant.  
Digital identity must embrace both being public and being 
private by providing both anonymity and pseudonymity. It 
always exists in a context, and we expect the context to have 
the same degree of separation, which we are used to in the 
natural world, even though space and time no longer serve 
as insulation. 
In a user-centric IDMS, the issue of distrust between the 
user and the relying party is addressed, because the identity 
provider acts as a trusted third-party broker. This occurs 
because individuals may have several identity providers and 
for that matter, their information may not be stored in one 
place. User will naturally trust brokers they can control 
whereas relying parties will not trust a broker if the claims 
asserted are actually self-vouched by the user [16], [19].  
This is what the U-prove and OAuth technologies seek to 
address by managing claims and attributes so that relying 
parties are assured that the information is correct before en-
gaging with the user, without necessarily revealing the iden-
tity of the user. This approach will still leave the user in con-
trol. U-Prove and OAuth enable the use of services with 
minimum disclosure of personal information and fine-
grained delegation of authorization between service provid-
ers. Some of their features are summarized in the following. 
A. U-Prove 
U-Prove is an advanced cryptographic software designed for 
electronic transactions and communications to overcome a 
long-standing dilemma between identity assurance and pri-
vacy already mentioned [19], [24]. The technology is part of 
Microsoft‘s drive to promote an open identity and access 
model for individuals, businesses and governments, based 
upon the principles of the identity metasystem [1].   
The dilemma is addressed by enabling minimal disclosure 
of identity information in electronic transactions and com-
munications. To ensure minimum disclosure the U-Prove 
Agent software acts as an intermediary between websites. 
This allows users to share data in a manner that protect their 
privacy, since they can now choose to share or otherwise. U-
Prove includes a mechanism that separates the retrieval of 
information from trusted third parties from the release of 
this information to the destination site. This implies that the 
organization issuing the information is prevented from 
tracking where or when information is used. The destination 
site is similarly prevented from linking users to their activi-
ties. 
B. OAuth 
Open Authorisation (OAuth) is an open standard for author-
ization, which gives users the ability to grant third-party 
access to their resources without sharing their passwords 
[25]. It also provides a way to grant limited access (in scope, 
duration, etc.). OAuth allows users to share their private 
resources (e.g. photos, videos, contact lists, bank accounts) 
stored on one site with another site without having to hand 
out their credentials, typically username and password. The 
concept of OAuth is based on the metaphor of a valet key of 
car, since it only gives third parties a controlled (limited) 
access to the car [26], [25]. OAuth mimics the valet key 
metaphor by providing sites with just enough information to 
accomplish what the user has requested, but not allowing 
third-party sites access to any other user information. Pre-
cisely, it only allow users to hand out to third parties tokens 
(instead of credentials) to their data hosted by a given ser-
TABLE II 
ANALYSIS OF U-PROVE AND OAUTH IN THE LIGHT OF THE USER-
CENTRIC SOLUTIONS 
DESCRIPTION U-PROVE OAUTH 
Purpose of the Ap-
plication 
Designed for Elec-
tronic Transactions 
and Communication 
For information shar-
ing on the internet 
Coverage  Video, Photos and 
Contact List 
Minimal Disclosure   
Trust Uses Cryptography Does not use Cryptog-
raphy 
User Control & 
Consent 
Privacy 
Perceived Trust 
Does not allow 
profiling 
Users can grant 3rd 
access personal re-
sources without shar-
ing password 
Pluralism of Opera-
tors and Technolo-
gies 
 OAuth works on 
Desktop Applications 
Mobile Phones and 
Living room devices 
Privacy as Default Uses Advanced 
Cryptography 
 
 
 
Perceived Useful-
ness 
Has both Open 
Standard and Appli-
cation specific ver-
sions 
 
Uses Open Standard 
 
Human Integration 
Perceived Ease of 
Use 
Permit local storage 
of U-prove tokens 
OAuth 2 is Client 
Developer Centric. 
Users can easily de-
velop applications on 
OAuth platform 
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vice provider. The tokens could be granting a printing ser-
vice access to photos without sharing username and pass-
word. OAuth 2.0, which is the latest version, focuses on 
client developer simplicity (not user simplicity) while 
providing specific authorization flows for web and desktop 
applications, mobile phones, and living room devices [25]. 
Table II presents some of the main features of U-Prove 
and OAuth and compares them with the privacy design prin-
ciples discussed above. 
V. IMPROVED FRAMEWORK AND GUIDELINES 
The fact that present privacy laws are based on principles 
drafted many years ago, when the web did not exist, shows 
that privacy legislation need to make a quantum leap to be in 
line with the realities of today‘s real life operating environ-
ment. In cyberspace, there are no clear visual cues about the 
level of privacy available [7]. Existing privacy legislations 
and regulations do not adequately deal with digital identity 
issues, because laws are country- or region-specific, and the 
FIPs are not laws.  
Important privacy considerations are in relation with data 
collection, data usage, storage, data minimization, anonymi-
ty, pseudonymity, and the extent to which individuals have 
control over how their personal information. Generally, 
identity systems that facilitate anonymity and pseudonymity 
may offer better promise of privacy. In essence, to ensure 
privacy, risk of vulnerability, the lifespan of identity infor-
mation, and the costs of processing, storage and deletion are 
critical. 
 Linking identities that do not share the same degree of 
anonymity, or that contain different sets of attributes may 
allow others to overcome pseudonyms and discover the us-
er‘s identity. Differences may arise as to which practices of 
identity and other data collection, use, and retention can be 
left to market forces and those that should be the subject of 
government intervention. Controlling linkability involves 
both maintaining separate contexts so observers cannot ac-
cumulate sensitive data and being cautious when identity 
information is requested to keep track of information disclo-
sure [5]. 
Since much of the literature on privacy enhancing initia-
tives aims at introducing technologies with the user in mind 
it was apparent that the analysis is carried out in the light of 
Technology Acceptance Model. For instance if privacy must 
be at the core of the design [22], then obviously the original 
TAM must be extended to include privacy as a construct. 
Likewise, to address the dilemma between identity assur-
ance and privacy, trust must also be added as a construct. 
  We therefore propose to add Perceived Privacy and Per-
ceived Trust as constructs to the original TAM, cf. Fig. 2. 
As shown in the diagram Perceived Usefulness, Perceived 
Ease of Use, Perceived Trust and Perceived Privacy will 
affect users‘ behavioural intentions and in the end their deci-
sion to conveniently use the IDMS. 
IDMS having privacy design flaws can generate adverse 
consequences for consumers, including the risk of identity 
theft. On the contrary, IDMS can play a privacy protective 
role, particularly in the context of social interactions.  
 
 
On the basis of this extended theoretical framework rec-
ommendations for improved design of privacy-enhancing 
IDMS can be derived. Table III is a summary of the major 
items, which must be taken into consideration during the 
design of privacy-enhancing technologies. For instance, the 
concept of privacy will result in a system having privacy as 
a default [22]. Similarly, trust considerations will help in 
overcoming the ―dilemma between identity assurance and 
privacy [19], [24]. 
VI. FINDINGS & CONCLUSION  
This study analysed the concepts of privacy, trust, and the 
key regulatory and research initiatives on privacy enhancing 
IDMS. Major frameworks including the Laws of Identity, 
the Fair Information Practices principles and the Privacy by 
Design principles were examined. As a result, we found that 
perceived privacy and perceived trust should be added as 
constructs to the Technology Acceptance Model, in order to 
adequately represent privacy-enhancing identity manage-
TABLE III 
FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED IN THE DESIGN OF PRIVACY-ENHANCING 
IDMS 
Item 
Measurement  
Criteria 
Description 
Perceived 
Usefulness 
Ease of Use 
Enhanced Security  
Identity Fraud pre-
vention  
Data Quality 
 
Perceived usefulness describes 
the degree to which a person 
believes that an innovation will 
boost their performance 
Perceived 
Ease of 
Use 
User-Centricity 
Universal Coverage 
(Online/Offline)  
Perceived ease of use describes 
the degree to which a person 
believes that adopting an inno-
vation will be free of effort. 
Perceived 
Privacy 
Best Practices 
Regulations, Privacy 
by design  
Application of Laws, Regula-
tions and the laws of identity 
(see table 2) 
 
Perceived 
Trust 
Ability The group of skills, compe-
tences and characteristics that 
enable a person to have some 
influence within a domain or 
context (Mayer, Davis, & 
Schoorman, 1995) 
 
 Benevolence The extent to which the trustee 
is believed to want to do good 
to the trustor irrespective of 
profit motives. 
 
 Integrity Integrity is the perception that 
the trustee will adhere to a set 
of principles that the trustor 
subscribes to. 
 
 
 
 
Fig.2. Technology Acceptance Model applied to privacy-enhancing identity 
management. The diagram shows that users‘ privacy behaviour is influ-
enced by how easy it is to use the IDMS, and their perceptions on the sys-
tem‘s usefulness, privacy and trust considerations. This behaviour then 
influences the actual system use. (Adapted from [4]). 
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ment for the benefit of users and service providers. This also 
aids in resolving the ―Privacy Paradox‖ and resolving the 
dilemma between privacy and identity assurance. 
The extensive amount of research in this area has lead us 
to the stage, where we now have a fairly good understanding 
of design principles and best practices, and we also start to 
have technologies available for development of services and 
solutions that can empower users, protect their privacy and 
support fine-grained control of access to resources online. 
This work is therefore an important contribution to the fur-
ther development. 
One of the remaining issues is to explore how these 
frameworks and technologies can address privacy and iden-
tity management in the physical world. The mechanisms of 
establishing trust in the physical world are not necessarily 
the same as those that are used in the digital world online. 
As it has been phrased ―the Internet was built without a way 
to know who or what you are connecting to‖ [1]. Many of 
the recent initiatives are aimed at establishing an ―identity 
layer‖ on the Internet. But since physical identity cards, to-
kens etc. are use in both worlds we need more work to link 
the usage and achieve ―human integration‖ [1]. Users need 
to feel equally comfortable consuming services in the physi-
cal and digital world.  
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